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Abstract
There is a trade-off between the costs and beneﬁts of international diversiﬁcation. This paper
shows that the costs for property investors can be reduced substantially through investments
in public real estate companies, which concentrate on their local, domestic market. We com-
pare the performance of 18 international operating property companies over the sample period
1984 through 1995 with the performance of property companies operating on their domestic
market. We ﬁnd that the international companies underperform the domestic companies. We
also ﬁnd this difference is not due to factors such as transaction costs, leverage, and currency.
 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
International investment can be a very effective way to spread the risk of a pro-
perty portfolio.
1 Property markets are locally driven, which would suggest that the
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts to be reaped from foreign property holdings can be substan-
tial. Indeed, Eichholtz (1996a) has shown that property markets have lower degrees
of international correlation than stock and bond markets, and that international pro-
perty investment is more effective in reducing overall portfolio risk than is the case
for international investment in stocks and bonds. Nevertheless, while stock investors
quite commonly invest abroad, property investors rarely acquire property beyond
their local borders, with UK and Dutch investors as notable exceptions.
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +31-10-408-2790.
E-mail address: c.koedijk@fbk.eur.nl (K. Koedijk).
1 This issue has been thoroughly documented by, among others, Grauer and Hakansson (1987), Liu
and Mei (1996), Eichholtz (1996b) and Eichholtz et al. (1998).
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This may be caused by the fact that the direct property markets, the private markets
for buildings and land have higher information and transaction costs than the public
stock markets. We expect that the less informed out-of-town investors may pay too
much for properties, and tend to buy more lemons than their better-informed local
competitors at these private markets. This would translate into lower risk-adjusted
returns. International investors always face a trade-off between diversiﬁcation bene-
ﬁts and information costs. If information costs are so high that all potential beneﬁts
of international diversiﬁcation are mitigated international investment may then not
occur. Transaction costs may also imply a stronger focus on the home market.
If this argument is valid, the home bias of property investors will surely diminish
with the development of the global property share market. Public markets may be
more informationally efﬁcient than the private property market, and hence may allow
investors to build up foreign property exposure without the information and monitor-
ing costs that doing so in the direct property market would entail. This implies that
the beneﬁts of international diversiﬁcation can be reaped at much lower costs.
The past 15 years have seen a strong worldwide growth in the number and size
of the publicly listed real estate companies. The number of listed property companies
has increased from 140 at the end 1984 to 360 in December 1995, while market
value during the same period rose from $30 billion to approximately $300 billion.
Listed property companies now exist in at least 30 countries.
2 Publicly listed real
estate companies come in two varieties: those which only invest in their own coun-
tries, and those which also invest abroad. This enables us to test our hypothesis that
property companies which are only active in their own country provide a superior
performance to property companies, which are active across the border.
In this paper we start in Section 2 with an overview of the development of the
international real estate securities market in the last 15 years. In Section 3 we
describe the data we use, which is from the GPR Global Real Estate Securities
Database, and we present a ﬁrst comparison between international real estate compa-
nies and portfolios of domestic companies. Section 4 is about research methods. We
present different performance measures, and the way we use them for our purposes.
Results are presented in Section 5, while section Section 6 explains the results. Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper.
2. The international real estate securities market
The last decade has seen a remarkable growth in the number and size of the listed
real estate securities. The performance of the real estate securities markets has dif-
2 All information is from the Real Estate Securities Database of Global Property Research (GPR). The
database contains information about some 600 publicly listed real estate companies in 30 countries all
over the world. In Europe—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom; in North America—Canada
and the United States; in the Far East—Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand,
the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand; and in the rest of the world—Argentina, Israel,
Mexico, and South Africa. For all property companies, the performance is tracked. More information
about these indices can be found in Eichholtz and Koedijk (1996a,b).351 P. Eichholtz et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 20 (2001) 349–366
Fig. 1. Continental indices.
fered markedly across continents. Fig. 1 presents the GPR real estate securities indi-
ces for North America, the Far East and Europe. The indices are market-weighted
total returns in US dollars and only consist of property companies that invest in the
domestic market. Survivorship bias is always an issue if the return of a company is
evaluated against a benchmark. Global Property Research argues that their index is
largely free of survivorship bias as they have checked for the existence of different
property companies over the years and leave companies in the index for 12 months
after the market capitalization dropped below the threshold level of 50 million US
dollars. From Fig. 1 we see clearly that the market in the Far East performed best,
but that it also experienced the highest volatility. After 1993 the Far Eastern market
was strongly inﬂuenced by the performance of the Hong Kong market, whereas at
the end of the 1980s, Japan dominated the market. North America and Europe show
a less volatile performance. Table 1 shows that the annualized standard deviation of
Table 1
Summary statistics continental indices, 1984–1998a
North America Europe Far East Global
Average return 10.44 9.23 11.64 10.67
Standard deviation 15.10 13.34 30.73 17.92
Correlation coefﬁcients
Europe 0.26
Far East 0.29 0.33
Global 0.43 0.58 0.94
a The upper panel of this table gives annualized average returns and standard deviations of the GPR-
LIFE Global Real Estate Index and of three continental sub-indices. The lower panel gives correlation
coefﬁcients between the continental sub-index returns.352 P. Eichholtz et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 20 (2001) 349–366
the real estate securities returns in the Far East was 30.6 percent in the sample period,
while it was only around 14 percent in Europe and North America.
Table 1 also provides information on average returns and return correlation coef-
ﬁcients between real estate securities markets. The Far Eastern property securities
markets generated an average annualized return of 11.2 percent, while North America
showed a 10.1 percent average annualized return in the sample period. Table 1 also
shows that the correlation coefﬁcients between the continents are positive but rather
low, with an average of around 0.3. This suggests a strong risk reduction potential
for international real estate diversiﬁcation and conﬁrms earlier results by Giliberto
(1990), Gordon (1992) and Eichholtz (1996b).
3. International and domestic property companies
As we mentioned earlier, most property companies invest only or mainly in their
own country. However, there are also a number of listed property companies with
an international real estate portfolio. Many of these companies have been around for
a long time. Before the expansion of the global real estate securities market, investing
in these companies was the only practical way private and small institutional inves-
tors could build up international real estate exposure. This was probably the main
reason for some property companies to follow an international investment strategy.
Before investigating the performance of these companies, we will ﬁrst describe
them in more detail. First, we have to decide where to draw the line between domestic
and international property companies. We classify a company as domestic if it invests
at least 75 percent of the portfolio in the country in which it has its main stock
market listing. By the same deﬁnition, internationals invest at least 25 percent of
their portfolio in one or more foreign countries.3 Based on this classiﬁcation, we
select all 36 international property companies from the GPR Global Real Estate
Securities Database. Appendix A gives an overview of these companies.
In the next step we reduce the number of internationals in our sample to 18 for two
reasons. First, we exclude international Hong Kong property companies investing in
mainland China since the close links between the two countries make it reasonable
to assume that those companies are really domestic. Secondly, we leave out compa-
nies that do not meet all the criteria for inclusion in the GPR Global Real Estate
Index.
4 Table 2 lists the remaining 18 international property investment companies
sorted by country. The table also provides sample statistics and basic information
about their size and portfolio mix. All numbers are in nominal dollar terms.
As the table shows, most internationals originate from the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom. Both countries have a long tradition of international investment,
3 Internationals, therefore, elude both the companies that invest only in one foreign country and the
companies that diversify by investing in more foreign countries. The cut-off point of 75% is rather arbi-
trary, but tests where we use a different cut-off point do not inﬂuence the results qualitative.
4 The most important criteria for a company to be included in the index are a market capitalization
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not only in property, but also in stocks, bonds and other assets. Columns 3, 4, 5 and
6 of Table 2 give mean returns, standard deviations, the ﬁrst month for which we
have an observation and the number of observations over which the statistics have
been calculated. The average monthly returns of the international property companies
have varied greatly in the sample period. The best performer was City Developments,
with an average monthly return of 2.07 percent. There were 6 companies with a
negative return in the sample period. Volatility’s also differ substantially. Returns
of German and Dutch property companies have been most stable with standard devi-
ations of 2.56 and 4 to 8 percent respectively. Companies like Fabege (Swedish), City
Developments (Singapore) and Markborough (British) have a much more volatile
performance, with standard deviations of 16.97, 12.52 and 12.07, respectively.
The next ﬁve columns in Table 2 give information about the portfolio mix of the
internationals, the number of countries they invest in and the market capitalization.
These columns show that there are great differences in the portfolio composition of
the international property companies. Some have all their assets in only one conti-
nent, or are very concentrated in only one continent, while others, like Rodamco
(Dutch), Immobilie `re Hotelie `re (French) and MEPC (British) are truly globally diver-
siﬁed. The number of countries in which assets are held varies from 1 to 14. In that
regard, Immobilie `re Hotelie `re (French), Rodamco (Dutch), and City Developments
(Singapore) are most diversiﬁed. The market caps of the internationals are higher
than the average market cap of domestic property companies. That is, in December
1995 the international property companies had an average market capitalization of
almost $1200 million, whereas the domestic companies had about half: $700 million.
This could indicate that internationals were partly established to beneﬁt from scale
advantages. City Developments (Singapore), Rodamco (Dutch) and MEPC (British)
are the largest international companies. The table does not show a clear relationship
between the number of countries invested in and the sample statistics, or the market
size of the companies.
To get a ﬁrst impression of the performance of these international property compa-
nies relative to the performance of the domestic companies, and to get a basic insight
into our question of whether direct or indirect international property investment is
better, we construct two indices combining the returns of all companies within each
group. Fig. 2 presents graphs of these two indices. This chart clearly shows that the
domestic companies have performed much better on an overall basis. Both indices
are set at 100 in December 1983, but while the international index stands at 252 in
December 1995, the domestic index has risen to 545 in the same month. This corre-
sponds with annual average returns of 7.72 percent for the international index and
14.13 percent for the domestic index, or a return difference of 6.41 percent.
Table 3 gives annualized returns and standard deviations for the complete sample
period and three 4 year sub-periods. Between 1984 and 1995, the standard deviations
of the global index, the international index and the domestic index are 17.69 percent,
17.25 percent and 18.46 percent, respectively. The sample statistics for sub-periods
show that the superior average return of domestic property companies relative to the
internationals is rather consistent over time. Domestics have a higher average return
than the internationals in all three sub-periods that we investigate. In the ﬁrst and355 P. Eichholtz et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 20 (2001) 349–366
Fig. 2. International and domestic indices.
Table 3
Sample statistics internationals and indicesa
1984–1995 1984–1987 1988–1991 1992–1995
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. Dev.
Global 13.67 17.69 28.01 19.77 4.74 18.50 8.25 13.86
Internationals 7.72 17.25 20.28 19.34 0.26 16.61 2.63 15.35
Domestics 14.13 18.46 29.35 21.09 4.83 19.48 8.20 13.48
a The table gives annualized sample statistics for the whole period and three different sub-periods
based on monthly logarithmic returns in US Dollars and presents them in percentage terms.
second sub-periods, the higher returns for the domestic indices come with higher
standard deviations, but in the last sub-period the internationals have a standard
deviation of 15.35 percent, which is higher than the 13.86 percent for the global index
and 13.48 percent for the domestic indices. In all these periods, the internationals
are outperformed on a risk-adjusted basis. The results imply that the difference in
performance between internationals and domestic property companies is not due to
lower risk taken by the former. Thus, we may conclude that the worse performance
of the internationals relative to the domestic property companies is evidence in favour
of our hypothesis that internationals suffer from an information disadvantage that
adversely affects their performance. In the next section we set up the empirical frame-
work to investigate this issue more formally.
4. More formal tests of the price for information
The previous section has given some preliminary evidence of the superior perform-
ance of domestic property investment companies relative to the internationals. How-356 P. Eichholtz et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 20 (2001) 349–366
ever, the above comparison is rather crude, since it may well be that the total com-
bined portfolio of the internationals has a different composition than the combined
portfolio of the domestic companies. The difference in performance we ﬁnd between
these two groups could therefore be a consequence of diverging portfolio compo-
sitions instead of investment strategies. In fact, as can be seen from Table 2, inter-
nationals as a group invest relatively little in the Far East, and as we showed in Table
1, the returns in this continent have been much higher than in the other continents. To
deal with this, we build for each international real estate company a mimicking index
including only domestic companies, with the same combined portfolio composition
as that particular international company. This mimicking index reﬂects the perform-
ance the international company would have had if it had not bought, managed and
sold its properties itself but had selected local (domestic) property companies to do
that for it. In this approach, we therefore compare real estate portfolios that are equal
in composition. They only differ in how they are built up: through direct international
real estate investment or through indirect investment. Comparing these portfolios
directly tests our hypothesis.
For all property companies we collect monthly performance data from January
1984 through December 1995. We take share prices at the last day of the month
and reinvest all dividends. All indices are constructed in US dollar terms. The infor-
mation about the portfolio allocation of the internationals is collected from the annual
reports. Hence, we change the composition of the mimicking indices annually at
the reporting day in the annual report. We collect portfolio information about the
geographical spread of investments on the country level. However if a company only
presents the composition on a continental level we use that. In most cases the annual
reports present the geographical spread of the portfolio in terms of asset value. If
the reports do not present the value of the investments directly, we use the square
footage of the properties as a proxy. This information is available for all companies
in the sample, and the only assumption that we have to make is that the value of
each square foot is equal over the different countries.








in which Pt is the stock price at the end of month t, DVt is the dividend in month
t, Rsit is the depreciation of the dollar relative to the company’s home currency, and
It=0 is 100.
Then, we calculate a customized mimicking index for each international property
company, based on the returns of the domestic property companies, but with the





in which wit is the percentage invested in country or continent i in month t by the
international company, Rit is the return of domestic index i, expressed in US dollars,357 P. Eichholtz et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 20 (2001) 349–366
It=0 is 100, and nt is the total number of countries in which the company has invested
in month t.
We compare the internationals with their customized indices using two perform-
ance measures: the Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s alpha. Both measures are derived from
the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The Sharpe measure gives an indication of the
return in respect to the total risk of an asset measured by the standard error of the
returns. A higher ratio indicates a better performance since it implies a higher return





in which Ri is the average return of the individual company or index, Rf is the risk
free rate, and Si is the standard deviation of the return.
For each international and its corresponding customized index, we calculate the
Sharpe measure. As we denominated all share prices in US dollars we use the US
risk free rate. As a proxy for the latter we use the 1-month T-bill rate.
The Jensen Alpha determines whether a company out- or underperforms the mar-
ket or an index by investigating whether the performance is signiﬁcantly different
from what we would expect from the security market line. It measures the perform-
ance difference by a in Eq. (4):
RitRftaibi(RmtRft)eit (4)
where Rit is the return of the international property company, Rft is the risk free rate,
Rmt is the return of the market index, and eit is an error term.
In asset pricing tests it is always difﬁcult to determine which market index to use.
In the ﬁrst test we use our mimicking index as the market index. Doing this enables
us to compare the performance of international property companies with the domestic
property companies directly. We present the results in Section 5 and in Section 6
we extend the tests to account for possible biases.
5. Results
In this section we present the results of the performance tests and see whether
there is indeed a cost to diversiﬁcation in markets with private information. Before
presenting the Sharpe Ratio and the Jensen Alpha, we present and discuss Fig. 3,
which compares international and domestic property companies while correcting for
the country allocation of the internationals. In Fig. 2 we presented the performance
of all domestic companies versus the performance of the 18 internationals. We
explained that the better performance by the domestic companies could be due to
overweighing the Far East market, as the internationals did not invest as much in
the Far East. Therefore, we re-calculate the index of the domestic companies with
a correction for country allocation decisions. It is simply the market weighted sum-
mation of all mimicking indices. Fig. 3 shows that the internationals are still outper-358 P. Eichholtz et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 20 (2001) 349–366
Fig. 3. Internationals versus aggregate customized index.
formed by the domestics. The index of the internationals is exactly the same and
increases from 100 in 1984 to 252 in 1995, whereas the aggregate mimicking index
increases from 100 in 1984 to 348 in 1995. The average annual returns are 7.7
percent and 10.4 percent respectively. If we make the comparison with Fig. 2, we
see that the internationals are still outperformed by the domestic companies, but that
indeed some of the difference was due to the country allocation. The remaining
average difference of 2.7 percent annually is an indication of the cost of international
diversiﬁcation in non-public markets. This result suggests that international diversi-
ﬁcation is not a free lunch in private markets.
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for these two indices. This once again
shows that the domestic property companies outperform the internationals. We also
present in this table the Sharpe ratio of the combined international index and of the
aggregate mimicking index. These are 0.12 and 0.31 respectively, which is further
evidence for the better performance of the domestics.
To get a more detailed picture of this outperformance, we present Sharpe ratios
for the individual international property companies versus the ratios for the corre-
sponding mimicking indices in Fig. 4. The Sharpe measures of the internationals are
given on the horizontal axis, while the Y-axis gives the Sharpe measures of the
corresponding mimicking indices. Thus, a dot to the right of the 45-degree line
implies superior performance for the internationals. The ﬁgure shows that only 4
internationals show this superior performance relative to their customized index. The
other 14 are beaten by it. The outperformers are Fabege and Hufvudstaden (Sweden),
City Developments (Singapore), and Schroders (Netherlands). It seems that the
Swedish companies were able to deal with the crash of the domestic real estate
market very effectively. Using a one-sample binomial test, we investigate whether
the outperformance of the domestic mimicking portfolios is signiﬁcant. We ﬁnd a
test statistic of 5.56, which has a c distribution with one degree of freedom and
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Fig. 4. Sharpe ratios, 1984–1995.
we also present in Fig. 4 the Sharpe ratios of the overall portfolios of indirect and
direct real estate investment. This is the solid point in the graph.
Table 5 presents the results of the regression of Eq. (4). It clearly shows that
most companies have a negative Jensen a, which suggests that the internationals are
outperformed by their own domestic customized indices. However, only Sarakreek
has an a that is signiﬁcantly negative. There are ﬁve companies that have a positive
a, but none of these values is signiﬁcant. Three out of the four companies that had
a higher Sharpe ratio than their mimicking index have a positive a as well. Only
Fabege had a higher Sharpe ratio, but a lower Jensen a. CS Euroreal and Capital &
Regional Properties have a positive a, but had a lower Sharpe ratio than their corre-
sponding index.
To test whether the a’s together are signiﬁcantly different from zero we use a
methodology developed by Gibbons et al. (1989). The test statistic reads as follows:
J=a ˆ(Var(a ˆ))−1a ˆ, where a ˆ is a vector of the estimated a’s for all international pro-
perty companies. If we calculate the statistic for the whole sample period we get a
value of 34.02 which has a c distribution with 18 degrees of freedom and is therefore
signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. This means that the international property compa-




a t b tb=0 Tb=1 nR 2
Markborough 2.40 1.92 1.57 5.76 2.10 64 0.35
Revenue Properties 1.57 1.35 0.27 0.85 2.26 48 0.02
Immobilie `re Hotelie `re 0.72 0.65 0.49 1.74 1.81 80 0.04
CS Euroreal 0.05 0.15 0.67 6.32 3.08 35 0.55
German City Estates 1.62 1.82 0.73 2.78 1.01 60 0.12
Innovest 0.36 0.59 0.91 5.28 0.54 101 0.22
Rodamco 0.03 0.07 0.44 4.71 5.96 144 0.14
Sarakreek Holding 1.96 2.90 0.17 1.20 5.76 132 0.01
Schroders 0.24 0.52 0.75 6.22 2.04 49 0.45
VIB 0.22 0.71 0.66 7.38 3.80 129 0.30
Wereldhave 0.28 0.75 0.73 7.32 2.67 144 0.27
Fabege 2.24 0.85 0.42 3.35 4.71 60 0.16
Hufvudstaden 2.05 1.04 0.32 3.59 7.75 36 0.27
Capital and Regional 0.17 0.21 0.99 6.46 0.08 96 0.31
Properties
Hammerson 0.71 1.37 1.56 13.86 5.00 144 0.58
MEPC 0.38 1.15 1.18 21.06 3.19 80 0.76
Slough Estates 0.19 0.39 1.23 15.76 2.99 132 0.66
City Developments 1.28 1.80 1.02 9.36 0.17 84 0.52
Internationals Index 0.21 1.05 0.98 21.37 0.53 144 0.76
a This table gives the results of the estimation of Eq. (4). Column 2 gives the estimation of a in
percentages. Column 3 gives the corresponding t-statistic. Column 4 gives the b estimation. Column 5
gives the t-statistic for b equal to zero and column 6 gives the t-statistic for b equal to one. Column 7
gives the sample length and column 8 the R2.
6. Explanation of the test results
In this section we discuss our test results. We will give several possible expla-
nations and discuss and test their impact on our information hypothesis.
6.1. Transaction costs
A possible difference in performance might be caused by the transaction costs.
Even though there is quite a huge literature on index tracking, which means that the
funds don’t have to buy all funds in the index to have roughly the same return
characteristics as the index itself, they still have to buy many individual property
companies to mimick the portfolio.
5 The cost to mimick the portfolio was not
5 Another possible explanation for the difference in performance could be the service international
property companies offer investors. By buying the shares of international property companies investors
don’t have to face transaction costs to purchase different properties themselves. It could be possible that
they are willing to pay a premium for this service.362 P. Eichholtz et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 20 (2001) 349–366
included in the analysis so far, whereas for the international property companies
these costs are already reﬂected in the stock returns. To correct for this possible bias







in which N is the number of datapoints that we have, w is the weight of the particular
property company in a single country. In our sample we have a total of 1702 datapo-
ints (from 18 companies with a maximum of 144 months), which gives a W equal
to 1.36%. This means that 0.86% of the total portfolio is bought and sold each month.
If we annualize this ﬁgure we get a 16.32% change in the portfolio each year. This
number does not incorporate the initial purchase of the portfolio or possible expan-
sion of the portfolio. To estimate the cost involved with this change in the portfolio
we surveyed some banks in Europe and asked them for the transaction cost they use
in their calculations. For Europe they use 0.50% as an estimate for the cost to buy
stocks, 0.75% for stocks in the United States, and 1.00% for stocks in the Far East.
If we combine these ﬁgures with the change of the portfolio we get a total cost
ﬁgure of maximum 0.20%, which we should subtract from the difference between
the internationals index and the mimicked index. This means that the calculated
difference of 2.7% should be reduced to 2.5%, which is still a very signiﬁcant num-
ber. The cost to mimick the portfolio is therefore not a possible explanations for the
underperformance of the international property companies.
6.2. Currency and leverage effects
The international property companies might inﬂuence the performance by hedging
some of the currency risk and by using debt to ﬁnance the properties as well. We
calculated the mimicked index in all previous tests on an unhedged basis. This means
that these indices do not incur the cost to hedge the portfolio. Furthermore, the
internationals as well as the domestic property companies might use debt to ﬁnance
the operations, which might inﬂuence the results. To correct for these effects several
tests are possible. We chose, to be consistent with our previous tests, to expand Eq.
(4) in the following way:
RitRftaibi(RmtRft)glRbj,tgYenRYen,tgDMRDM,teit, (6)
in which the last three R terms are added to the equation. The ﬁrst variable corrects
for the leverage and the last two for the currency. We estimate this equation for
each fund with OLS as all variables are orthogonal to the error term. For Rbj,t we
use the monthly yield on the all lives government bond index for the United States
calculated by Datastream. Ryen,t, and RDm,t represent the logarithmic return on
exchange rates between the US dollar with the Japanese Yen and the German Mark
respectively. We chose these currencies as they capture most variation in the
exchange rate market.363 P. Eichholtz et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 20 (2001) 349–366
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of Eq. (6) for all funds. For the three
factors, we extend the model with, we present the t-statistics to see whether they
inﬂuence the analysis. The ﬁrst factor is the yield on the U.S. government bond,
correcting for leverage effects. For none of the companies is the coefﬁcient signiﬁ-
cant. Furthermore, in contrast to expectation its value is negative for only seven
companies. We had expected that the value would be negative since the property
companies are ﬁnancing their operations with debt. In this case an increasing yield
would have a negative effect on performance. The currency effects are larger. The
German Mark, in particular, has a signiﬁcant impact on the performance of 6 compa-
nies and the Japanese Yen on one. In our sample 10 companies have a negative
coefﬁcient, which means that the performance is negatively affected if the exchange
rate increases.
The use of the correcting factors has an effect on our measure of outperformance
as well. First of all none of the companies give a signiﬁcant out- or underperformance
anymore. Secondly, the number of companies with a positive value of a increased
to seven. This means that the factors indeed do explain parts of the performance of
the property companies.
To see whether there is still information left in the error term, we use the Q-
statistic. The critical value for 10 lags is 18.31. In Table 6 we see that we reject
the hypothesis of white noise for three companies. These companies are Schroders,
Wereldhave and Hammerson. The return of all other property companies is explained
by the explanatory variables.
6.3. Size effects
An effect that gives investors the possibility to reduce the cost of information is
to grow in size. Our hypothesis is that international property companies can over-
come the information disadvantage as they grow larger. In this way they can become
so big that they are actually a local player. As a fact we can show that there exists
a positive correlation between market capitalization and the a of a property company
by doing the following regression:
aig0g1Xihi, (7)
in which ai is the result of Eq. (4) for company i, and Xi is the average market size
of property company i. We assume that the market capitalization is a good proxy
for the size of the portfolio, which is relatively rough as internationals have different
debt ratios.
The results for regression for Eq. (7) show that the value of g1 is signiﬁcantly
positive at the 5 percent level. This means that a property company can beneﬁt from
scale advantages to deal with the information problems more effectively. This could
be a reason for the higher market capitalization of internationals compared to dom-
estic companies as shown in Section 3.364 P. Eichholtz et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 20 (2001) 349–366
Table 6
Estimation of the extended modela
abtlev tYen tdm R2 Qstat
Markborough 8.56 1.61 0.55 0.14 0.36 0.35 12.08
(0.77) (5.64)
Revenue Properties 9.32 0.22 0.82 0.11 1.08 0.07 11.02
(0.70) (0.62)
Immobilie `re Hotelie `re 5.99 0.93 0.61 1.55 0.86 0.10 5.43
(0.66) (2.60)
CS Euroreal 1.22 0.14 0.70 0.30 7.51 0.87 2.40
(0.69) (1.54)
German City Estates 5.02 0.45 0.77 1.07 0.32 0.15 7.64
(0.60) (0.30)
Innovest 1.43 0.64 0.46 1.84 1.14 0.31 11.35
(0.31) (3.31)
Rodamco 0.52 0.28 0.54 0.16 6.40 0.44 17.30
(0.34) (3.53)
Sarakreek Holding 7.00 0.19 1.15 0.73 0.49 0.03 12.06
(1.59) (1.32)
Schroders 0.67 0.60 0.16 0.77 3.84 0.61 14.88
(0.14) (4.40)
VIB 2.00 0.38 0.85 0.54 3.22 0.41 19.71
(1.03) (3.60)
Wereldhave 0.99 0.42 0.32 1.14 3.14 0.37 11.21
(0.55) (3.30)
Fabege 17.31 0.37 0.86 1.14 1.53 0.21 30.02
(0.73) (2.83)
Hufvudstaden 32.86 0.35 1.61 0.69 0.83 0.34 13.10
(1.71) (3.62)
Capital and Regional 4.04 1.00 0.65 0.28 0.24 0.31 13.03
Properties
(0.62) (6.23)
Hammerson 2.67 1.53 0.72 1.11 0.01 0.58 13.80
(1.01) (12.97)
MEPC 1.48 1.16 0.63 0.58 0.42 0.76 20.10
(0.87) (19.44)
Slough Estates 1.15 1.24 0.36 2.21 2.39 0.67 8.37
(0.46) (15.12)
City Developmental 6.21 1.01 0.91 0.10 0.33 0.52 18.10
(1.14) (8.99)
Internationals Index 0.13 0.89 0.22 0.56 4.11 0.81 8.12
(0.14) (20.33)
a This table gives the results of the estimation of Eq. (6). Column 2 and 3 give the estimation a and
b. The t-statistics are in parenthesis. Columns 4 through 6 give t-statistic for the leverage effect, the
exchange rate with the Japanese Yen, and the German Mark. Both exchange rates are stated in foreign
currency per 1 U.S. dollar. Column 9 gives the R2 and the last column the Q-statistic. We calculated this
value with 10 lags, which gives a critical value of 18.31 with a conﬁdence level of 95%. The statistic is
c-distributed. For our sample this means that for most companies the error terms are white noise.365 P. Eichholtz et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 20 (2001) 349–366
7. Conclusion
There is a trade-off between the costs and beneﬁts of international diversiﬁcation.
This paper shows that the costs for property investors can be reduced substantially
through investments in public real estate securities, which concentrate on their local,
domestic market. We compare the performance of 18 international operating property
companies over the sample period 1984 through 1995 with the performance of pro-
perty companies operating on their domestic market. We ﬁnd that the international
companies underperform the domestic companies. We further ﬁnd that this difference
is not due to factors such as transaction costs, leverage, and currency. Size appears
to be the only factor that can improve the performance of the international pro-
perty companies.
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